British Somaliland, May to August 1940

Return to India, and Beyond

On the 16th of April 1940, 39 Squadron left Singapore and flew in several hops to Lahore, India, arriving on the 24th. It’s clear that, at this point, they had no orders for further action, because several members of the squadron left for the hill station at Lower Topa in the Murree Hills, about 250 miles away. But they had to return almost immediately, because on the 3rd of May, “Orders were received to move the squadron to Karachi on 5th May, and to prepare for a further move Westwards.” Two days later, nine aircraft left Lahore and — having received additional orders — continued on to Heliopolis (Cairo), Egypt, via several stops for refueling and/or overnight in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Palestine, arriving on the 7th. Then, after maintenance, on to Sheikh Othman, Aden, arriving on the 13th of May.²

For four more weeks, the squadron’s Phoney War continued — and my father did virtually no flying. He had been to Aden before, of course, and for the same reason: in anticipation of the Italians attacking British colonies in East Africa.³

The squadron’s ground crews and stores, traveling by ship, finally caught up with them on the 10th of June. The whole squadron was celebrating their reunion that evening when the Commanding Officer was called away for an important phone call . . .

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By the early summer of 1940, Mussolini saw his dreams of building a new Roman Empire in Africa tantalizingly close to reality. Hitler’s armies were crushing the allies in Europe. Holland capitulated on the 15th of May. The Belgians surrendered on the 27th. The British army in France was evacuated across the English Channel, abandoning most of its vehicles and heavy equipment, over a desperate two weeks in late May and early June. France was on the brink of surrender. England (and the British Empire) must surely be the next victims of Hitler’s all-powerful war machine.⁴ It was high time for her enemies to jump in, grab some real estate, and get into as strong a position as possible for the peace negotiations which were surely imminent.⁵

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On the 10th of June, Italy declared war on Britain and France. The news broke up 39 Squadron’s party in Aden that evening, but it was no surprise to anyone, least of all the British. Two days later, seven aircraft, including my father’s, bombed the main Italian airfield in southern Abysinnia (now Ethiopia) at Dire Dawa. That night,”three separate raids were carried out by the Italians on Aden. There were no casualties in the Squadron.” ⁶

The Italian Conquest of British Somaliland

The Italians invaded British Somaliland on the 3rd of August, and the British evacuated to Aden 16 days later.

This campaign at the southern end of the Red Sea was a sideshow. The situation at home was critical, with invasion apparently imminent. The focus of the RAF was on what became known as the Battle of Britain. The Empire’s principal strategic concern in the Middle East was the security of the Suez Canal, the vital route for troops and supplies between Europe and Asia. The protection of Egypt was therefore much more important than the colonies in East Africa. And, of these, British Somaliland had so little value that until mid-1939 the entire defense force numbered 564 men, of whom only 14 were British.⁷ It was surrounded by Italian colonies, Abysinnia and Italian Somaliland, except for French Somaliland (Djibouti) to the north.

The limited British re-armament of British Somaliland in late 1939/early 1940 was predicated on French support. After the fall of France in late June, the French General in Djibouti decided to remain allied with the British, but on the 15th of July, a new General sent from Vichy France arrived and reversed the decision. In his report on the campaign, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, General Sir Archibald Wavell, wrote:

“When the French at Jibuti [sic] decided to accept the armistice, I had to decide whether to evacuate British Somaliland forthwith or to continue to hold it. . . . I decided that we should continue to defend the approaches to Berbera for as long as possible. Brigadier Chater reported that if the force was increased to five battalions he considered that there was a good prospect of holding his positions; also withdrawal without fighting at all would, I considered, be more damaging to our prestige than withdrawal after attack.” ⁸

The Italians invaded on the 3rd of August with 26 battalions (35,000 men) supported by tanks and approximately 80 pieces of artillery. The British had just four battalions, no tanks and four pieces of artillery. In retrospect, the outcome was never seriously in doubt.

The situation in the air appeared superficially more balanced. On the Italian side, the immediate support comprised 27 bombers, 23 fighters and seven reconnaissance aircraft.⁹ On the 3rd of August, the British had approximately 22 bombers, 16 fighters (of which ten — the Blenheim IVF’s — were primarily appropriate for long-range shipping strikes, not fighter cover), and four reconnaissance/general purpose aircraft.¹⁰

In reality, however, the Italians effectively controlled the air. The RAF was seriously handicapped by operating from a base two hundred miles away across the Red Sea. The Gladiator fighters were detached from Aden to bases in British Somaliland on the 24th of July, but this put them in harm’s way. Four were destroyed either in action or on the ground, and the remaining two withdrawn by the 8th of August.¹¹ The under-gunned and relatively unmanoeuverable Blenheims then operated without any fighter cover.

As the British Empire troops fought a defensive stand, and from the 15th of August made an orderly retreat to the coast, they had the impression, as their colleagues had at Dunkirk a few weeks before, that the RAF was not doing much of anything. Major Ewen Cameron Thomson, an officer with the Northern Rhodesia Regiment during the defence of British Somaliland, certainly thought this.¹² He describes an incident immediately after the evacuation to Aden when the general in command of the Somaliland campaign, Major-General Godwin-Austen, met with all the Army officers who had been involved, specifically to counter this impression:

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The Italians did not significantly harass the British evacuation from Berbera to Aden. The defeat probably did not make much impression back home, because the Battle of Britain was at its height, but the PR people put their best spin on it.

But this was, of course, a humiliation. When the local Somaliland Camel Corps troops were paid off and disbanded as their British officers embarked for Aden, they threw the money on the ground. “They were disgusted”, George Davison-Lumley, a sergeant in the 21st East African Brigade, remembers. “They were part of us, and they were let down.” ¹⁴

My father’s experience

My father’s flying from this time does not indicate a hectic schedule, even after the Italians invaded British Somaliland on the 3rd of August. The Squadron flew a total of 136 hours on operational sorties in July.¹⁵ Since my father flew about 9.5 hours on operations that month, and the Squadron was well under full strength, his workload was slightly above the average. Part of the explanation for the relative infrequency of operations is that the squadron was rapidly losing aircraft. By the 7th of August, they were down to seven serviceable aircraft and two of these were then transferred with their crews to 11 Squadron.¹⁶

By the 12th of August, the final battle had been joined and it must have been clear, at least to the senior British commanders, that the outcome was not seriously in doubt. This turned out to be a fateful day for my father.

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The Fight at the Tug Argan Gap: 12 August 1940

My father was used to getting up early to fly in the relative cool and smooth air of the dawn. That was how it had been in training in Egypt, and on the Frontier, and in Singapore. He was an old hand at the tropics. (Whenever we left on a family trip, his final instructions the evening before were always “wheels rolling at dawn!”)

But on the 12th of August 1940, he took off from Aden at 07:25, long after sunrise, and he and his crew were already sweating freely in the 90° F (30° C) heat. His regular Observer/Bombadier and fellow Welshman, Sergeant Geoffrey “Tubby” Hogan, was alongside him on his right. It was a tight fit. His Gunner, Corporal John Wintle, was in the rotating turret behind the cockpit.

As the plane cleared the coast and headed south across the Gulf of Aden, my father reached down to his right and raised the undercarriage. There was now a welcome breeze through the “cooling gills” on the side of the cockpit as they approached their cruising speed of just over 200 mph. They would be over the target in a little more than an hour. They settled into loose formation alongside the two other Blenheims on this raid, piloted by Sergeant Thomas Crehan and Flight Lieutenant Robert Milward, my father’s Flight Commander since the days on the Frontier. ¹⁸

Their target was the Italian troops attacking the British defensive positions on a series of hills at the Tug Argan Gap, where the principal road to the coast crossed a usually dry watercourse (“Tug”). If these positions were not held, the road to Berbera was clear and the battle for British Somaliland was lost.¹⁹ The battle at the Gap had begun the day before, with air and artillery bombardment for four hours in the morning, and a tentative advance by the Italians in the afternoon. The outnumbered and outgunned defenders needed all the help they could get from the RAF, but they too were at a severe disadvantage.

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Sottotenente Alberto Veronese of the 410′ Squadriglia took his time over his breakfast coffee that morning. Five days before, his squadron had taken over the British airfield at Hargeisa, less than 20 miles from the Tug Argan Gap. Veronese was an experienced pilot, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War. He had already shot down the first of his eight Blenheim victims.²⁰ He knew the Blenheim bomber was faster in straight and level flight than his obsolescent Fiat CR 32 singleseater biplane, but he also knew it was much less maneuverable and had less firepower.²¹ He also knew that, since his colleagues’ successful attack on the RAF fighter aircraft at Berbera four days earlier, the RAF bombers had been operating without any fighter protection.²²

Veronese took off at 08:30. Five minutes before, Sergente Maggiore Enzo Omiccioli had taken off from the nearby airfield at Jijirga.²³

At 09:00, they arrived over the battle. Following is the account of what followed, from the 410′ Squadriglia Relazioni Giornaliere:

“[Veronese] . . spots and shoots at a Bristol Blenheim at low level, which, though effectively strafed, is able to escape; subsequently, he spots and attacks another, which, evidently being hit, reacts with defensive weapons slightly wounding S.Ten. Veronese and burning his flight suit, which the pilot is able to extinguish. At that moment, the same Bristol Blenheim is attacked by Sergente Maggiore Omiccioli . . . The enemy aircraft runs away with evident troubles and is compelled to land with gear up at Berbera airfield.” ²⁵

Following is the account from 39 Squadron’s Operations Record Book:
“No. 565108. Flight Sergeant THOMAS was pilot of the third Blenheim of a flight detailed to carry out a dive bombing attack on a gun position which was giving a lot of trouble to our troops holding TUGHARGAN GAP. During his dive, Flight Sergeant THOMAS saw an enemy fighter attack his leader. He released his bombs and pursued the fighter, which quickly maneuvered and delivered a frontal attack. During this swift attack by the fighter, Flight Sergeant Thomas’s Air Observer was killed and he himself received a 12.5 mm. explosive bullet in his right shoulder, rendering his arm useless. He managed to avoid further attacks from fighters and using his handkerchief to stem the flow of blood, he set course for BERBERA forty miles away. Having his right arm useless he was unable to operate the undercarriage and flap control levers. He attempted to make a landing with his undercarriage retracted. The landing was successful, doing very little damage to the aircraft. It is estimated that he had been flying in this condition for twenty minutes and when he landed his body was cold from loss of blood. His Air Gunner, who had remained at his post to beat off further fighter attacks was unaware that his pilot and Air Observer had become casualties, until they landed. By this superhuman effort, Flight Sergeant THOMAS saved the lives of his Air Gunner and himself, thereby setting a high example of courage and determination to all.” ²⁶

This was probably written by my father’s Flight Commander, then Flight Lieutenant Robert Millward. Perhaps he felt my father saved his life. In any event, this commendation was a generous gesture in the heat of battle, and it earned my father his second Distinguished Flying Medal.²⁷

My father’s plane fell into Italian hands when Berbera was overrun after the British evacuated on the 19th of August. Remarkably, photographs of the damaged aircraft survive:

I try to imagine the horror of that desperate 20-minute flight to Berbera. Did Sergeant Hogan die immediately, or was he screaming in his last agony? My father fights to control the plane with his left hand, struggling to get away from the enemy fighters, flying low and fast to outrun them, with the wind roaring at 200 mph through the gaping hole in the cockpit. The heat, and the noise, and the blood and guts on the controls. And the pain, and knowing he would go into shock shortly. And realizing there is no way he can get the undercarriage or the flaps down because the controls are on his right, and he can’t use his right arm. So flashing back to that other wheels-up landing in Siam almost exactly a year before, he brings L8402 in for a forced landing.

No doubt the first person who helped him was his wireless operator/air gunner, Corporal Wintle.²⁹ Somehow he got down to the port and out to the hospital ship Vita (RN Hospital Ship No. 8).

Previous: Singapore Next: Epilogue

Notes:

I am indebted to Italian aviation historians Alfredo Logoluso and Stefano Lazzaro for Italian sources, including scans, translations, and photographs. My principal other sources for the British Somaliland campaign in the air, from both the British and Italian points of view: Christopher Shores, Dust Clouds in the Middle East, Grub Street, London: 1996. (The chapters in Shores’ book on the campaigns in East Africa were co-written with Corrado Ricci, who was the commanding officer of the 410^a Squadriglia in Abysinnia. It was pilots from this squadron who brought down my father on the 12th of August. See also Corrado Ricci, Vita di pilota, Mursia, Milan: 1976.) Jon Sutherland and Diane Canwell, Air War East Africa 1940-1941, Pen and Sword Aviation, Barnsley: 2009. Ken Delve, The Winged Bomb: History of 39 Squadron RAF, Leicester: Midland Counties Publications, 1985. Contemporary records: 39 Squadron’s Operations Record Book (cited below), the Squadriglia Relazioni Giornaliere of the 410′ Squadriglia, and my father’s Pilot’s Flying Log Book. Accounts of the campaign not specifically focused on the war in the air are Bill Stone, The Invasion of British Somaliland, 1998, http://stonebooks.com/history/Somaliland.shtml, accessed 30 January 2021, and the official campaign history by Major-General I.S.O. Playfair: History of the Second World War: Mediterranean and Middle East, volume 1: Early Successes against Italy, London: HMSO, 1954, pp. 171-178, https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Med-I/UK-Med-I-9.html, accessed 30 January 2021.

1. Map source: Imperial Military Geography, Major D.H. Cole, London: Sifton Praed, Ninth Edition, September 1937, facing p. 342.
2. 39 Squadron’s Operations Record Book (ORB, Form 540): AIR-27-407-1, The National Archives of the UK (TNA).
3. See https://fatherflying.com/aden-1935-36/.
4. This was a desperate time for England. There were many people, including some in the government, who thought the only option was to seek a conditional surrender to Hitler. Winston Churchill took over as Prime Minister of a National Coalition Government on the 10th of May with a mandate to fight on.
5. Churchill referred to this period as “The Rush for the Spoils.” Winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour: The Second World War, Volume II, London: Cassell & Co, 1949, title of Chapter Six.
6. 39 Squadron’s Operations Record Book, op.cit.
7. “This force, called the Somaliland Camel Corps, was the only military force for external or internal defence in a country of which the area was larger than that of England and Wales.” General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, Supplement to the London Gazette, 5 June 1946, p.2720.
8. Ibid, p.2722.
9. Shores, op. cit., p. 45.
10. This rough calculation is based on these numbers: 8 Squadron, with one flight of Blenheim Mk 1’s (maximum four serviceable aircraft), and one flight of Vickers Vincent army cooperation/general purpose biplanes (again, a maximum of four serviceable aircraft); 203 Squadron, with Blenheim Mk IVF’s (perhaps ten serviceable aircraft); 11 and 39 Squadrons, with Blenheim Mk 1’s (on a good day, 18 serviceable light bombers) and the recently formed 94 Squadron with six single-seater Gladiator fighters (because of their short range, these were detached to forward bases in British Somaliland). Shores, op. cit., p. 13ff; Sutherland and Canwell, op. cit., p. 31ff; 11 and 39 Squadrons’ Operations Record Books (ORB, Form 540), The National Archives of the UK (TNA): AIR 27/157, and AIR-27-407-1, respectively.
11. Shores, op. cit., p. 46.
12. Major Ewen Cameron Thomson, Oral Interview, Imperial War Museum, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80007169, accessed 30 January 2021. Reel 4, 22:29: “Where were the British aircraft?”
13. Major Ewen Cameron Thomson, op. cit., Reel 7, 21:33 to 23:14. Following is the senior regional RAF officer’s very defensive report after the campaign was over (Air Vice-Marshal G.R.M. Reid, Supplement to the London Gazette, 5 June 1946, p.2726-2727):
    “12. Although the maximum air effort possible was afforded in support of the Army in Somaliland it may not have appeared impressive from the ground. The difficulties in which we were working were as follows:
    (a) There was no protected aerodrome from which our fighters or bombers could operate in Somaliland. The two aerodromes—one at Berbera and one at Laferug—were quickly made untenable by enemy bombardment which was practically unopposed by ground defences. Two of our fighters were destroyed in the initial stages on the ground owing to lack of protection normally afforded by the Army. Fighter aircraft therefore had to be withdrawn.
    (b) In view of the above it was impossible to operate fighters at all and for this reason, and only this, the enemy had local air superiority.
    (c) Because there was no aerodrome in Somaliland from which to work, our bombers were forced to operate from Aden which as a range of 200 miles over sea. At this range the air effort was greatly hampered and it was impossible to keep in close touch with the military situation.
    (d) Since the enemy had local air superiority our bombers were continually being attacked by fighter aircraft while the crews were trying to concentrate their attention on the ground to assist the Army and trying to get a grip of the fast changing military situation. This made our bombers extremely vulnerable.
    (e) The aircraft with which we are equipped is a fast medium bomber which is excellent for its proper role but unsuitable for close army co-operation work, especially when not protected by fighters.
    Conclusion.
    13. In short the air effort expended in support of the Army in Somaliland was the maximum which could be given by the air forces available and with no protected aerodrome from which to work. It proved expensive in aircraft and crews but certain valuable results were obtained.”
    The British Commander-in-Chief, Wavell, felt the affair had been handled well: they had put up a good fight, and had left the field without too much loss of personnel or prestige. (Wavell, op. cit., p. 2725.) But Churchill was, predictably, furious and both Wavell and Godwin-Austen’s careers suffered. RAF losses, in proportion to their numbers were much more significant than the ground forces: seven aircraft were destroyed, and ten others severely damaged, over one-third of the total. (Playfair, op.cit., p. 178.) Twelve aircrew were killed, and three (including my father) wounded.(Stone, op. cit.)  British Somaliland was recaptured by the British, with virtually no opposition, seven months later, in March 1941.
14. Oral History, Reel 4, 15:00-16:30, IWM 7260, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80007064, accessed 26 March 2021.
15. Delve, op. cit., p. 59.
16. Delve, op. cit., p. 60.
17. Cockpit photo courtesy of https://www.flight-manuals-online.com accessed 24 January 2021.
18. For notes on this raid see 39 Squadron Operations Record Book, op.cit. Sergeant Crehan was shot down on 17 August, but he and his crew survived. Crehan, however, later died of a heart attack, presumably sometime before the Squadron left Aden in November 1940. He is buried in Maala Cemetery there. See https://www.rafcommands.com/forum/showthread.php?1822-401124-Unaccounted-airman-24-11-1940&p=175884#post175884, accessed July 28, 2023.
19. Stone, op, cit., p.6: “The British position at Tug Argan, although making best use of the hills, rough terrain, and the course of the dry waterway, was much too long for the number of troops available, without depth, and vulnerable to infiltration. Similarly, only the Gap itself was covered and there was no way to prevent the more numerous Italian forces from sending units around both flanks to envelop the entire defense. But at no other position in British Somaliland could the outnumbered defenders hope to halt the Italian advance.” See Shores, op.cit., p. 45 for a similar overall assessment.
20. See the website “Biplane fighter aces Italy” http://surcity.kund.dalnet.se/italy_veronese.htm, accessed 4 April 2021.
21. The following description of the Blenheim is representative of several sources: “By the time [the Blenheim Mk 1 light bomber] would be put into service as a war fighting machine, it was found to be slow and would be vulnerable to enemy fighter attack aircraft. In 1938 the decision was made to convert the Blenheim 1 to a long range fighter. But although it was found to be just as cumbersome and its fire power was to prove inadequate, the Air Ministry at the time thought it was better to put the aircraft into service than nothing at all.” It was more successful as a night fighter. http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0012.html, accessed October 28 2011. “Blenheims had already earned the reputation of being sitting ducks. They were the daylight bombers the Luftwaffe pilots drooled over.” Geoffrey Morley-Mower, DFC, AFC (one of my father’s contemporaries on the North West Frontier), Messerschmitt Roulette: The Western Desert 1941-42, St Paul: Phalanx Publishing, 1993, p.2. This introductory section of the book concerns July 1941.
22. Shores, op. cit., p. 46, and Stone, op.cit., p.4.
23. The take-off times from the Italian squadron records are 06:30 and 06:35 respectively. I believe they must have been operating on the Rome time-standard, two hours ahead of the British clocks in Aden, since this is the only way I can synchronize their records, my father’s and 39 Squadron’s Operations Record Book.
24. Omiccioli shot down five aircraft before being shot down himself on February 3, 1941. He was posthumously awarded the Medaglia d’Oro, the Italian equivalent of the British Victoria Cross or the US Medal of Honor. See http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/italy_omiccioli.htm, accessed 4 April 2021.
25. Scanned copy of the original documents provided by the Italian aviation historian, Alfredo Logoluso, and the translation by his colleague Stefano Lazzaro, personal communications, July 2011. Stefano Lazzaro notes this is the only Italian squadron diary available from the Italian units in East Africa. The diary entries are signed by the commanding officer, Capitano Corrado Ricci, who contributed very significantly to Stone, op. cit. Stone notes about Ricci in his Introduction: “A stickler for accuracy, he would allow no claim to be submitted without full certainty as to its exactitude—and as a researcher I can confirm that his is the only unit I have ever come across where every claim can be verified, and some of the ‘probables’ as well!” (p.1).
26. Op. cit. My father’s Observer/Navigator who died that day was Acting Sergeant Geoffrey Mortimer Hogan (RAF No. 521035). He was my father’s regular number two, and from Porthcawl, Glamorgan, about 40 miles from my father’s village in Wales. They not only flew together, but messed together in the Sergeants Mess. They would have known each other well. He is buried in Somalia, at Hargeisa War Cemetery.
27. The announcement of the award appears in The London Gazette, 1 November 1940, p.3. His first DFM (for actions in Waziristan the year before) had been published in the Gazette just one week earlier.
28. Vita di pilota, p. 131: “l’avanzata occupando Berbera nella notte sul 19. All’indomani vado al atterrare su quell’aeroporto: Veronese mi è di scorta e ne difende il cielo mentre io porto il mio 32 accanto al Blenheim che vi giace scassato e vado a dargli un’occhiata; l’abitacolo è sporco di sangue e in fusoliera ci sono diversi buchi. Vedo alcuni ascari del battaglione di Sora che ha occupato la zona; scatto un foto ai due velivoli e riparto.”
    “The advance occupy Berbera the night of the 19th. The next day I go to land at that airport: Veronese is escorting me and defending the sky while I take my 32 next to the Blenheim that lies in a broken-down condition and I go to have a look at it; the cockpit is covered in blood and there are several holes in the fuselage. I see some askari from the Sora battalion that has occupied the area; I take a photo of the two aircraft and leave.”
29. Corporal Wintle was killed just eight days later. His pilot on that day was only 20 years old. “Early in the morning on 20 August four Blenheims of 39 Squadron and one of 11 Squadron, RAF, attacked the Ala Littoria hangar at Diredawa. This target was hit and damaged; a S.81 under repair being burnt and splinters damaged a CR.32. While on the run-up to the target the bombers were attacked by two CR.42s of the 413^a Squadriglia and 20-year-old Pilot Officer Paul Edwin Osborne Jago’s (RAF No. 40916) Blenheim Mk.I (L8474) was shot down in flames by Capitano Santoro, the crew being killed (Pilot Officer Jago, Sergeant John Astil Wilson-Law (RAF No. 580723) and Corporal John Herbert Wintle (RAF No. 519946)). Santoro also hit the 11 Squadron aircraft, which was badly damaged and crash-landed on return to Aden. Santoro’s CR.42 was hit in the fuselage during this combat.” http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/italy_santoro.htm, accessed 11 August 2022.